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Many observers were surprised by the depreciation of the euro after its launch in 1999.  Handicapped by a 
short sample, explanations tended to appeal to anecdotes and lessons learned from the experiences of 
other currencies.  Now sample sizes are just becoming large enough to permit reasonable empirical 
analyses. This paper begins with a theoretical model addressing transaction costs of trading the euro.  The 
model of pre- and post-euro foreign exchange trading explains wider spreads on the euro as a result of three 
possible causes: a reduction in hedging opportunities due to the elimination of the legacy currencies, policy 
uncertainty on the part of the ECB, and asymmetric information due to some traders having prior knowledge 
of ECB policies.  However, even informal empirical evidence tends to reject the hypothesis that spreads 
were larger on the euro than the mark for all but the first few months.  This seems like an unlikely candidate 
to explain euro depreciation over the prolonged period observed.  After addressing spreads, the model is 
turned toward an explanation of the exchange rate level.  By specializing the fundamentals considered to the 
euro-area inflation rate, the model is structured toward the dynamics of learning about ECB policy with 
regard to inflation. While a stated target inflation rate of 2 percent existed, it may be that market participants 
had to be convinced that the ECB would, indeed, generate low and stable inflation.  The theory motivates an 
empirical model of Bayesian updating related to market participants learning about the underlying inflation 
process under the ECB regime.  With a prior distribution drawn from the pre-euro EMS experience and 
updating based upon the realized experience each month following the introduction of the euro, the 
evidence suggests that it was not until the fall of 2000 that the market assessed a greater than 50 percent 
probability that the inflation process had changed to a new regime.  From this point on, trend depreciation of 
the euro ends and further increases in the probability of the new inflation process are associated with euro 
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  21. Introduction 
 
 
                                                
The launch of the euro on January 1, 1999 was the most important international financial 
event since the end of World War II. This new currency was expected by many to garner 
immediate acceptance and challenge the role of the dollar as a vehicle currency. Nevertheless, its 
role in the foreign exchange market has been less than what was expected. 
  As shown by Hartmann (1998), the nations that comprise the European Monetary Union 
make an economic unit at least as large as the United States. European Union (EU) GDP exceeds 
US GDP, EU population exceeds US population, EU exports surpass US exports, and outstanding 
claims in total EU capital markets (bank assets, bonds and equities) are larger than those in the 
United States. All these indicators would lead us to think that the new currency would challenge 
the supremacy of the dollar as the most important currency in the world. Nevertheless, the 
triennial Bank for International Settlements (BIS) survey indicates that the dollar's share of 
foreign exchange market activity has risen while that of the euro compared to legacy European 
currencies has fallen. In 1998, the dollar entered on one side of 87 percent of foreign exchange 
transactions and the legacy euro currencies 53 percent
1. In 2001, the dollar share rose to 90 
percent while the euro's share was but 38 percent. Further evidence is provided in Hau, Killeen 
and Moore (2002) who show that the average daily dollar/euro volume in foreign exchange 
trading is nine percent lower than the dollar/DM volume
2. Moreover, they show that the trade 
volume of the euro with the yen and the Swiss franc decreased by 44 and 25 percent respectively 
when compared with the mark. This decrease in volume is striking if we consider that the mark is 
only one of the legacy currencies in the monetary union. 
 
1 Since there are two currencies involved in every foreign exchange (FX) transaction, the global sum of currencies' 
shares will equal 200 percent. 
2 They are comparing the average daily volume between the period January 1998 to December 1998 with the period 
January 1999 to August 1999.   Our focus is not on the volumes traded but on the prices. In particular, we examine 
theoretically and empirically bid-ask spreads and the level of the dollar/euro exchange rate. Hau, 
Killeen, and Moore argued that wider bid-ask spreads have been important in restricting the role 
of the euro in the international markets. Our evidence confirms that this was true for the level of 
the spread, at least at the start of euro trading, but is questionable for the percentage spread. Our 
initial focus is on answering the following: What could lead to wider spreads on the euro than the 
legacy currencies? What role can the European Central Bank (ECB) play in affecting the 
dollar/euro spreads? What other institutional features of the market may contribute to higher 
spreads? Is there reason to expect that wider euro spreads may have been only a short-run 
phenomenon that will be eliminated over time? 
  To address these questions, the second section of this paper presents a theoretical model 
that can explain dollar/euro spreads as a function of expected volatility of the exchange rate due 
to policy uncertainty on the part of the ECB, the presence of informed traders with prior 
knowledge of policy actions, and a reduction in hedging opportunities due to the elimination of 
legacy currency trading. In the third section, we analyze the volatility and spread dynamics of the 
dollar/euro exchange rate around ECB meetings in order to infer the effects of ECB policy actions 
(or inaction). One goal is to examine whether ECB policy actions ``buy credibility''. In the fourth 
section we undertake the task of explaining the level of the exchange rate, arguing that the market 
was learning about the ECB policymaking process. We model this learning using Bayesian 
updating and show evidence that increments in the market’s confidence about the ECB 
policymaking process have a positive effect on the value of the euro. Section five offers a 
summary and concludes. 
  42.  Pre- and Post-Euro Model of FX Trading 
 
  The model is inspired by Hau, Killeen, and Moore and offers three potential explanations 
for an increase in bid-ask spreads on the dollar/euro exchange rate compared to the legacy 
dollar/mark exchange rate: reduction of hedging opportunities due to the elimination of important 
cross rates with the introduction of the euro, an increase in asymmetric information between 
informed and noise traders and the lack of historical performance of the recently created 
European central bank and resulting policy uncertainty relative to the Bundesbank. 
  We describe the behavior of three different market participants: marketmakers, informed 
traders, and uninformed or noise traders. The marketmakers observe currency demands from both 
types of traders and choose a bid-ask spread that maximizes their utility. The marketmaker has no 
way to distinguish the informed from the uninformed traders. The spread that arises from the 
profit maximizing behavior of the marketmaker depends on parameters that represent the three 
different factors that we argue explain the wider spread in the dollar/euro market. We will first 
model the equilibrium spread in the pre-euro period, then in the post-euro era, and finally 
compare the two to structure our argument. 
 
2.1 Pre-Euro  Period 
For simplicity, it is assumed that before the introduction of the euro, 3 different currencies 
exist: The dollar (A), the mark (G) and the franc (F). There exists a market maker for each 
currency pair; we denominate AG the market maker that trades dollar/mark, AF the market maker 
that trades dollar/franc and FG the one that trades franc/mark. The timing in this model is as 
follows: 
 
  5Period 1: The market maker AG quotes a bid-ask spread around the midprice 
M
AG P . Given 
this spread, the informed and uninformed traders submit their currency demands. These orders 
will create temporary inventory imbalance for the market maker AG. 
 
Period 2: Trading occurs in the other two pairs of currencies AF and FG, in which the 
market makers quote a bid-ask spread around the respective midprice 
M
AF P  and 
M
FG P . The inventory 
imbalance created in period 1 for market maker AG is shared via hedging orders with AF and FG. 
 
Period 3: The inventories are liquidated at the following prices: 
 



















  We assume that, pre euro, the shocks to the liquidation prices come from the G central 
bank and there is a fixed exchange rate for FG, as F and G are assumed to belong to a currency 
union. 
  As we mentioned before, the market maker AG receives orders from the informed that 
will be represented by O  while uninformed trader orders are represented by  . The demand 
















  6 Where 
I χ  and 
U χ  are assumed to be identical and independently distributed random 
variables which can take values of –1 and 1 (sell or buy) with equal probability ½. The function 
 is assumed to be continuous and decreasing in the spread, it is defined for  () 0 fs> (0, ) s∈ ∞  and 
has a maximum at  .  0 s =
  These demand functions implicitly assume that the informed traders do not have 
information regarding the exchange rate innovations ε , but still respond to changes in transaction 
costs. The amount of the currency that they are willing to trade fluctuates with the amount of the 
spread. On the other hand, the informed orders  ( )
I f s χ  contain information about ε . This is 
reflected in the positive covariance between the informed demand and the price innovations: 
  
  (, ) 0
IG Cov χε γ = >  (3) 
 
 
  This assumption implies that informed traders have prior knowledge about price 
innovations ε . This also implies that the market maker will sustain losses from trading with such 
agents. Since it is impossible for the dealer to identify types of trader, he/she will manage this risk 
by hedging these trades though trades with other market makers. In particular, since the currency 
rate FG has a fixed exchange rate, the inventory imbalance of market maker AG can be hedged 
via AF trades. 
  We also assume that the utility function for the market maker depends on the first two 
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  7 Where  ρ  is the risk-aversion parameter. The expected profit for the market maker 
consists of two components. The first one is the normal profit ( )
S ∏  for providing liquidity, the 
bid-ask spread, and is represented by, 
  
   (5)  () () () ( () / 2 1 | | || 1
SI U
AG Es E h O O h s f  ∏= − + = −  ) s
 
 Where  h is the fraction of inventory hedged, and ( ) 0 h 1 . ≤ ≤  A higher spread has an 
ambiguous effect on spread profits because of the negative relationship between spread and trade 
volume. 
  The second component of the expected profits ( )
L ∏  is the loss from providing quotes to 
informed traders. This second component is always negative and can be quantified as the 
covariance of the portion of the aggregate demand for the currency that was not hedged 
, with the changes in the exchange rate  () ( 1
IU hO O −+ ) ε , or: 
  () () ( ) () 1| | | | 1 ( )
LI U
AG G EE h O O h f




  To find the profit variance, we first need to note that the variance of   is zero because 
its value depends only on the spread and the total number of traders, this implies that the variance 
of the expected profits is equal to the variance of 
S ∏
L ∏ . Second, total order flow can take on three 
values: 
  
   (7) 
2( ) 1 / 4
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  8  Calculating the unconditional variance of the expected profits as the weighted average of 
the conditional variance: 
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  The utility for the market maker is: 
  
  () () ( ) () () ( )
22 2 11 ( ) 1
G
G
AG Uh s f s h f s h f s ε γ ρ ∏= − − − − − σ  (9) 
 
 
  Assuming that competitive entry results in driving the utility to zero, we can solve for the 
pre-euro spread in equilibrium as: 
  
  ( ) ( )
2 1
G
GG G sh f s ε γ ρ =+ − σ
)
                                                
 (10) 
2.2. Euro  Period 
After the introduction of the euro we are going to have two currencies: dollar (A) and euro 
(E). The market makers AG and AF now trade AE and the third market maker (FG) disappears. In 
this environment there are no hedging opportunities due to the elimination of the AF and FG 
markets  , and the assumption that both AE dealers observe the inventory shock. ( 0 h =
3 Now it is 
assumed that the shock to the liquidation prices comes from the E central bank. Following the 




3 Alternatively, one could simply assume that the market is consolidated into one market maker for AE. 





EE O O ∏= + = s f s  (11) 
 
  () ( ) () || ||
LI U E
AE E EE O O εγ  ∏= − + = −  f s  (12) 
 
  () ( ) ()
2 2 || || 2
E
LI U
AE E Var Var O O f s ε ε σ  ∏= + = 
 (13) 
 
The total utility for the market maker AE is: 
  




AE U s fs fs fs ε γ ρσ ∏= − −  (14) 
 
This implies that the equilibrium spread for the euro period is defined as: 
 
  
  ( )
2
E






2.3  Pre-Euro versus Euro Period 
When we compare the spreads in the two different periods, it should be clear that in the 
case of 
E γ γ =  and 
22
E G ε ε σ σ = , the spread in the pre-euro period is smaller than the spread in the 
euro period due to hedging opportunities that lower the exposure of dealers to inventory risk: 
  




EE G G fs hfs ε ε γ ρσ γ ρ +> + − σ  (16) 
 
  This implies that one source of higher spreads for the euro than the mark is the reduction 
in hedging opportunities. However, even in the case that hedging is unavailable or unused 
  10( 0 h = )
G , we would expect the same result,  , if the order flows convey more information 
about forthcoming price innovations 
E ss >
( )
EG γ γ > or if the exchange rate variance in the euro period 
is greater than the pre-euro period ( )
22
EG εε σ σ > . 
  With regard to the link between order flow and forthcoming price innovations, we are in 
the realm of informed traders. On one hand, with the introduction of the euro, it would be 
reasonable to expect an increase in the number of informed traders. The multinational nature of 
the ECB, whose General Council consists of the executive board (six members) and the governors 
of the national central banks, may allow for more information leakage from the policymaking 
process than existed under the prior system where policy was made in the national central banks. 
Such information leaks need not emanate from ECB employees, but from representatives of each 
country that are involved in the policymaking process. Critics of the ECB policymaking 
arrangement may argue that allegiances are first to the home country and second to Europe. If this 
is true, national officials assigned to ECB policymaking bodies may provide advance information 
about future actions of the ECB to the home-government officials and/or representatives of banks 
and other business firms in their home country. In terms of the model, this would be reflected in 
EG γ γ > , so we would expect wider spreads on the euro
4. 
On the other hand, the large number of governments and diverse interests involved in the 
policymaking process creates uncertainty in the market as to what kind of policy will ultimately 
exist. Actions of the dominant pre-euro central bank, the Bundesbank, were probably more 
predictable because of a national allegiance to a common goal that may be missing in the case of 
the euro and the ECB. In addition, the Bundesbank had a long record of good performance. With 
the recently created central bank there is no reference to past behavior that helps agents predict 
                                                 
4 Bossaerts and Hillion (1991) provide a theoretical model of asymmetric information and spreads in the FX market. 
  11policy. In this sense, the range of likely actions by this new central bank may be wider. This 
would imply in terms of the model that the expected variability or uncertainty associated with the 
value of the euro is going to be greater than it was for the pre-euro dominant legacy currency, the 




E ε ε σ σ < , so that wider euro spreads should be 
expected. 
  We now turn to the empirical evidence to examine what support, if any, the data provide 












  123.  Empirical Evidence on Spreads 
 
  We begin this section with descriptive statistics to illustrate the early experience of the 
euro. It depreciated continuously against the dollar throughout 1999. On a daily basis, it was only 
slightly more volatile when compared to the strongest currency in Europe before the euro was 
introduced, the deutsche mark (DM). Perhaps, most interestingly, the euro was traded at wider 
spreads in 1999 than the mark in prior years. 
  Our empirical analysis makes use of a data set for the dollar/euro exchange rate consisting 
of indicative bid-ask quotes posted by Reuters over the period from January 1 to December 31, 
1999. In total we have 3,306,829 observations. For purposes of comparison, we employ a similar 
data set for the mark/dollar exchange rate with more than 1,200,000 observations during the 
period from January 1 to December 31, 1994. The year 1994 is chosen as a year far enough away 
from the advent of the euro to be considered “normal” for purposes of comparison. Given that the 
number of quote arrivals is deepest during European trading hours and quotes are almost 
nonexistent on weekends, the empirical section of this study excludes all Saturday and Sunday 
observations and only considers quotes during European business hours on weekdays. 
  Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for 8:00 to 17:00 London time (GMT adjusted for 
summer time) for the level of the exchange rate, the first difference of the log-level of the 
exchange rate, and the spread for the 1994 dollar/mark and 1999 dollar/euro using all the quotes 
on the Reuters screen. The level of the exchange rate is the average of the bid and ask prices. The 
first difference of the exchange rate is the change between successive quotes, and the spread is the 
difference between the ask and bid price. In Table 1.a, we see that the average dollar price of the 
mark was 0.61578 during 1994 and the average dollar price of the euro was 1.06114 during 1999. The range from minimum to maximum value is about 10 cents for the mark and about 19 cents 
for the euro. Table 1.b shows that the mean change in the log of the dollar/mark exchange rate is 
positive, reflecting mark appreciation against the dollar in 1994. The average change in the log of 
the dollar/euro is negative, reflecting euro depreciation during 1999. Note that the standard 
deviation of both exchange rates is about the same. Even though the volatility is similar for both 
the mark and euro, Table 1.c shows that the average daily spread for the dollar/euro exchange rate 
is almost twice the average for the dollar/mark rate. This preliminary look at the data suggests 
that there may be something more than average volatility explaining the spreads
5.  But table 1.d 
shows that if the spreads are measured in percentage terms as (ask-bid)/midpoint, then the 
difference between the spreads on the mark and the euro are much smaller. 
  Table 2 shows the monthly average levels of the dollar/euro spreads for 1999. While it is 
true that spreads on the euro were particularly high early in the year, they are seen to remain 
much higher than the general level of spreads formerly observed on the mark throughout the year. 
In terms of percentage spreads, the evidence is not so clear. Figure 1 plots both the daily average 
level and percentage spreads over the 1999-2000 period.  While there is clearly a downward trend 
for the level of the spread, the percentage spread has a much less pronounced downward trend in 
1999 that appears to end in the late fall of that year.  Then for the remainder of the sample, the 
percentage spread exhibits no particular trend.  The decrease in the spreads from the winter into 
spring 1999 may be related to the effect of ECB actions building a reputation so that the ECB was 




                                                 
5 See Bollerslev and Melvin (1994) for theory and empirics linking FX bid-ask spreads and volatility. 
  143.1  Bundesbank, Fed, and ECB Meeting Days 
  To focus on differences across the former regime of Bundesbank and mark dominance 
versus the new regime of ECB and euro, we examine the exchange rate dynamics on days when 
the Bundesbank or the ECB policy-making committees met to consider interest rate changes.  The 
ECB Governing Council met 23 times in 1999 to consider appropriate interest rate policy (they 
typically met every other Thursday). On two days, April 8 and November 4, interest rates were 
changed.  The Bundesbank changed interest rates eight times in 1994: March 30, April 20, April 
27, May 10, May 18, June 1, June 15, and July 27. 
  We examine the volatility of the exchange rate on policy shift days.  For each day we 
calculated the squared 1-minute returns as a measure of volatility.
6  Since we examine the period 
of European business hours, there are very few minutes with missing quotes, but in these cases, 
we use the exchange rate taken at the previous minute. Figure 2 illustrates the time path of 
volatility for meeting days when interest rates were changed. It is immediately obvious that the 
volatility peaks are greater on the two ECB days than on any of the eight Bundesbank days. 
Another notable difference between Bundesbank and ECB days of policy changes occurs at the 
time of the policy news. Vertical lines indicate the time of day that the Bloomberg news service 
reported the meeting outcome. On the first day that the ECB changed interest rates, April 8, the 
market appears to have adjusted prior to the news. This is suggested by the rise in volatility prior 
to the news of the interest rate change so that at the time the news appears publicly, volatility has 
returned to normal levels. On the next day, November 4, the meeting outcome appears to be news 
as volatility spikes at the time of the news and then returns to normal levels. This initial view of 
the data suggests that perhaps the market had knowledge of the April 8 change via leaks from the 
meeting, but no such leaks occurred on November 4 nor on any later meeting. 
                                                 
6 The squared returns were multiplied by 10,000,000 to create units with whole numbers. 
  15  The figures for Bundesbank meeting days show no evidence of market anticipation of the 
meeting outcome. In fact, the volatility around the time of Bundesbank interest rate changes, 
suggests that the changes are correctly anticipated. This is consistent with the market having 
learned over the years how the Bundesbank conducts policy. The evidence is supportive of the 
hypothesis that the market was learning about ECB behavior so that ECB policy actions 
generated considerable financial market volatility but there was greater certainty regarding 
Bundesbank policy making so that Bundesbank policy actions had little discernable effect on 
exchange rate volatility. 
  Kim and Verrecchia (1991) derive the result that when an anticipated announcement turns 
out to be higher quality than anticipated, the price reaction to the announcement increases. In the 
present context, the dates of ECB meetings are known in advance, so the market anticipates, with 
some probability, that there will be some price relevant news coming from the ECB on meeting 
days. On most days, it may be that the quality of the news, in terms of value to market 
participants, is relatively low, resulting in little, if any, price response. However, on the two days 
where the ECB took action, the price response was quite dramatic around the time of the news, 
indicating that the quality of the announcement was higher than anticipated. Computing the 
unconditional variance of the exchange rate returns on the policy action days, the average daily 
variance for the euro is 2.6 times that for the mark. In this sense, the market is learning about 
ECB policy making. Days when the ECB makes a policy change are informative to the market for 
more than just the immediate change in the interest rate. The market is also learning how the ECB 
conducts policy, so the quality of the news is higher than anticipated on these days. In terms of 
the theoretical model of Section 2, the greater spread associated with the euro compared to the 
  16mark may be pricing this volatility or policy uncertainty effect associated with learning about the 
ECB. 
  The comparisons of ECB and Bundesbank meeting days may not be entirely fair, as the 
comparisons are for different years.  It could be the case that 1999 simply has more inherent 
volatility than 1994 and this is reflected in the volatility plots related to the ECB and Bundesbank.  
As an additional comparison, we examine dollar/euro exchange rate volatility on days when the 
Federal Reserve Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) met and changed interest rates in 
1999.  The squared returns are sampled at 1-minute intervals as before and the data are plotted in 
Figure 2.c.  One FOMC day, June 30, had the highest volatility of all days in Figure 2.  Another 
day, August 24, had volatility comparable to that of the ECB.  This suggests that on two meeting 
days in 1999, the FOMC created news that generated considerable volatility.  Note also that the 
plots in Figure 2.c. have two vertical lines.  One represents the official meeting ending time as 
reported in the minutes of the FOMC meetings and the other represents the time that the meeting 
end was reported by Bloomberg.  The Federal Reserve conducts a press conference following 
every FOMC meeting, and the press conference occurs with some lag after the meeting ends.  The 
volatility spikes for some days in 1999 indicate that the market was adjusting prices prior to the 
official announcement much like the case of the ECB on April 8.   
  The comparison of the FOMC and ECB meeting days when interest rates were changed 
indicates that the exchange rate dynamics on both types of days are somewhat similar.  If one 
interpreted the evidence regarding the April 8 ECB meeting as being consistent with leaks, then 
one would have to make a similar interpretation of the FOMC days. Rather than leaks, it may 
simply be that the market was positioning prior to the meeting end in anticipation of the 
forthcoming interest rate change. Furthermore, the evidence in Figure 2 suggests that if spreads 
  17were larger in 1999 for the dollar/euro than in earlier periods for the dollar/mark, it is unfair to 
place the blame on volatility associated with ECB policy.  It may be just as likely that the 
causality may lie with the Federal Reserve. 
  184.  Modeling the exchange rate 
 
  Beyond the issue of the spread and volatility considered so far, most scholars and 
practitioners would consider a more important issue to be understanding the determinants of 
exchange rate levels. Sinn and Westermann (2001) explain the weakness of the euro by arguing 
that holders of black market currency were afraid to convert their old European coins and black 
market notes into the euro in 2002, so they exchanged them for dollars prior to the appearance of 
euro currency. Alquist and Chinn (2001) say that the appreciation of the dollar after 1999 can be 
explained by U.S.-Euro area productivity differentials; however, the euro was also depreciating 
against the yen, so that this explanation alone cannot do. Our explanation emphasizes the role of 
the new central bank and the effect of lack of credibility on the exchange rate when the market is 
learning about the ECB policymaking process. 
  Credibility in the European Central Bank, or the lack of it, has undoubtedly played a very 
important role in the determination of the price of the euro. The ECB is not the central bank of 
one country. It covers the geographical area of 12 different countries, each with its own history, 
culture and economic background. In addition, the lack of historical performance creates 
uncertainty about the capability of this new institution in achieving low levels of inflation. Such 
characteristics initially increased the difficulty of accomplishing the principal mission of this 
central bank, price stability. 
  The introduction of a new central bank changed the inflation process in the euro area. 
Initially, the market had limited information about how committed this body was to maintaining 
low inflation. Even though the ECB stated that the primary objective, as laid down in the 
  19Maastricht Treaty, is to maintain price stability.
7 Rational agents need more than mere 
announcements to be convinced that the ECB is going to devote all its efforts to accomplish such 
a goal. They will use all available past and current information to evaluate whether or not the 
European Central Bank can achieve the target level of inflation. 
We hypothesize that beginning in 1999, the market was learning about ECB policymaking 
by observing the inflation rate in Euroland. Since then, agents are using this information to 
recognize how different the inflationary process is before and after the introduction of the ECB. 
We model this learning process using Bayesian updating to calculate the probability that the 
inflationary process in the euro area had actually changed. The estimated probabilities not only 
reflect the market’s belief that the inflationary process in the Euro area follows a new pattern, but 
also that agents are convinced that the ECB is capable and prepared to achieve the targeted levels 
of inflation. The evolution of the probabilities that represent the market’s beliefs, and 
consequently, the effects that learning has on the exchange rate, are computed based on the 
following assumption: in the event that the inflation process has actually changed, the market 
knows the parameters of the new process. 
In this section we present a simple model that explains the level of the exchange rate and 
how we construct the probabilities. Then, we empirically investigate the impact on the dollar/euro 
exchange rate due to the market learning about the policymaking of the ECB. 
 
4.1   Evolution of the exchange rate 
  We slightly modify the previous model to describe the level of the exchange rate. Here it 
is assumed that the market believes that exchange rates change for two reasons: the inflation 
                                                 
7 In order to bring about absolute clarity as regards the primary objective, the Governing Council decided to define 
price stability “as a year-on-year increase of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) for the euro area of 
below 2%”. 
  20differential between Europe and the U.S. and a stochastic shock. In the pre-euro era the 




AG AG o G PP ϕ η = ++ (17) 
 
 
where  o ϕ  is the “old” inflation differential between Europe and the U.S., and  G η  is a 




AE AE n E PP ϕ η = ++ (18) 
 
 where  n ϕ  is the “new” inflation differential between Europe and the U.S., and  E η  is a 
stochastic shock.  
 
4.2   Learning about the inflation process 
  The market considers that the inflation process in the euro area may have changed due to 
the creation of the ECB, so that the expected rates of inflation after January 1999 will be different 
from the ones observed before that date. 
  The market assumes that inflation in Europe used to be generated by a stationary process 
given by,  
  
  , ot o ot , ϕ δξ =+  (19) 
 
Where  o δ  is a constant parameter, and  , ot ξ  is a white noise, normally distributed 
disturbance term. We fix the prior distribution for inflation by considering the period prior to the 
establishment of the European Monetary Institute (EMI) in 1994.  The EMI was the precursor to 
the ECB and began the process of monetary policy coordination across European Union central 
  21banks.  Averaging the monthly percentage changes in the consumer price indexes of the euro-area 
countries over the period January 1990 to December 1993 yields the pre-euro mean and variance 
for inflation. The prior mean is 0.00334 and the prior variance is 0.000015. Once the euro begins 
on January 1, 1999, the market considers that the process might have changed, and now follows, 
  
  , nt n nt , ϕ δξ =+  (20) 
 
Where  no δ δ < , and  , nt ξ  is a white noise normally distributed random variable. Agents are 
assumed to know the parameters of the new distribution because they have knowledge of the 
ECB’s inflation target. 
Given the uncertainty about the true inflation process in Europe, the market assigns a 
probability   to the event that  , nt P δ  switched from  o δ  to  n δ , and   represents the probability 
that the market assigns to the event that the inflation differential has not changed, and 
. Subsequently, the market updates these probabilities after observing the 
realized inflation rate every month according to Bayes’ law: 
, ot P
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where  ( ,..., | tt k f ) i ϕ ϕδ −  is the likelihood function of  t ϕ  given  i δ , and the   are the prior 
probabilities at lag k. 
, it k P −
These probabilities reflect the credibility that the ECB has in the market, in particular over 
its ability to maintain price stability. The evolution of these probabilities over time will depend 
  22upon future realizations of the stochastic variable ϕ . The posterior probability   will converge 
to one, if in fact the process has changed, or to zero if there has not been a change. 
, nt P
The dollar/euro exchange rate will be a function of this learning process. If in fact 
inflation has switched from  o δ  to the lower  n δ  we would expect depreciation of the dollar as the 
market begins to recognize the change. 
Given that the probabilities are a recursive function only of the likelihood ratios, if we 
pick a probability at any point in time, iterating the equation forward or backward would create a 
unique path of probabilities. Instead of guessing an initial probability in January 1999, we use this 
characteristic to assume that the market believes that the new process exists by July 2002. The 
choice of July 2002 is made based upon a belief that 3.5 years of observations on ECB 
policymaking is adequate for the market to gain familiarity with the ECB policymaking process. 
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4.3  Constructing the Probabilities 
We compute the parameters of the “old” inflation process and its variance, using monthly 
inflation from the pre-EMI period of January 1990 to December 1993.
8 We omit the period from 
January 1994 to December 1998, assuming that inflation in these years does not reflect the latent 
inflationary tendencies of the whole euro area before the introduction of the new central bank, 
given that in this period countries were under great pressure to converge to the requirements of 
the Maastricht Treaty and monetary policy coordination was being discussed in the framework of 
                                                 
8 The pre-euro inflation rates were calculated using CPI data from the IMF International Financial Statistics data for 
10 countries in the Euro area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain).  Greek data were omitted since Greece did not join the euro-area at the start.  Ireland is omitted 
from the calculation as there are no monthly data for Ireland available for the period. 
  23the EMI. Similarly, the parameters for the new process  n δ  and its variance were estimated using 
data from January 1999 to June 2002.
9 
The probabilities are constructed in the manner described by equation (22). The resulting 
values are reported in Table 3.  Table 3 shows the evolution of the probabilities that the inflation 
process in Europe has switched from the old, pre-euro to the new, post-euro process, given the 
assumption that the market has learned that there is a new process by July 2002. During 1999, the 
market does not yet have enough information to judge that the inflation process has changed to 
n ϕ . By November of 2000 the market is convinced with a 62 percent probability that  inflation is 
governed by the new process and the probability never falls below 50 percent again. The very 
small initial probabilities of less than 1 percent during the first 11 months of 1999, support the 
hypothesis that much uncertainty existed regarding the ability of the ECB to achieve a low level 
of inflation. This skepticism started to disappear to a considerable degree by late 2000. 
Figure 3 plots the probabilities that the inflation process has switched along with the 
dollar/euro exchange rate. It is evident that for small values of the probability, the euro 
depreciates steadily against the dollar. After the probability is sustained above 50 percent from 
November, 2000 forward, the trend depreciation stops and there are periods of euro appreciation 
against the dollar.  The evidence in Figure 3 is consistent with the posterior probability of the 
new, lower inflation process followed by the ECB reaching a critical threshold, after which the 




                                                 
9 The inflation rates were calculated using the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices from the ECB statistics on-line. 
  244.4  Learning effects on the dollar/euro exchange rate 
  To test the hypothesis that learning about the inflation process was affecting the 
dollar/euro exchange rate, we estimate an OLS regression, with the monthly change in the 
logarithm of the exchange rate (  ) as the dependent variable, and the change in the 
probability that euro-area inflation follows a new process (∆Prob) as the independent variable.
€ $/ Log( E ) ∆
10  
Since Figure 3 suggests a definite change in structure occurred over the sample period, we model 
the effect of ∆Prob on the exchange rate allowing for a regime shift in November 2000.  This is 
the month where the probability of a shift in the inflation process rises above 50 percent and is 
sustained above this level for the rest of the sample. 
Estimation results are reported in Table 4.  The coefficient estimates indicate support for the 
hypothesis of a regime shift in November 2000 as the coefficient on ∆Prob interacted with a 
dummy variable that shifts from 0 to 1 in November 2000 is positive and statistically significant, 
indicating that the effect of the change in probability increases after November 2000.  So in the 
early part of the sample, when the probability of a shift in the inflation process is low, there is no 
link between this probability and the exchange rate.  Once the market starts to be convinced that 
the ECB is associated with a new, lower inflation process, then changes in the probability have a 
positive impact on the dollar/euro exchange rate.  As the market begins to recognize that inflation 
is governed by the new process, the euro not only stabilizes but appreciates against the dollar. The 
magnitude of the appreciation is positively related to the probability that the expected value of the 
inflation process has decreased.  The estimated coefficients imply that a 1 percent increase in 
∆Prob is associated with a 1.4 percent appreciation of the euro in the post-November 2000 
period. 
                                                 
10 The exchange rate is dollars per euro, and the data were retrieved from DataStream. 
  25Summary 
 
  The experience of the euro in its infancy has provoked much speculation in the search for 
explanations for the wide bid-ask spreads and steady depreciation. A theoretical model of spread 
determination was outlined that identifies three important determinants: policy uncertainty 
associated with the ECB, informed traders with prior knowledge of policy actions, and reduced 
hedging opportunities due to the elimination of the legacy-European currencies.  The latter effect 
has been well discussed in Hau, Killeen, and Moore, so we do little more than acknowledge its 
potential importance. 
  With regard to the policy uncertainty effect, the argument is that the market has no prior 
record of ECB behavior so that there is learning occurring in the early stages of ECB policy 
making.  We present some suggestive evidence that euro volatility on the first ECB policy action 
days was much greater than earlier mark volatility on Bundesbank policy action days. This is 
consistent with the news regarding ECB policy actions helping to resolve the noise associated 
with ECB Governing Council meetings. Beyond the impact of the immediate change in interest 
rates announced by the ECB after two meetings in 1999, the policy actions convey important 
information to the market on how the ECB will conduct policy. 
  With regard to the asymmetric information effect, the argument is that ECB policy 
making involves a more heterogeneous group of agents than did Bundesbank policy.  One may 
view the Bundesbank as making policy to achieve national goals with any international goals 
strictly secondary in importance.  So, in a sense, policy makers at the Bundesbank were all "team 
players" working to achieve a common goal.  In the case of the ECB, it may be that the 
representatives of the member countries have a dual allegiance that results in information leakage.  
  26This is not to say that leaks come from the ECB staff, but rather the representatives of the national 
governments who are linked to the Governing Council.  There would be great incentive to protect 
the home market from any harm done by ECB policies.  In this case, tipping off a home bank or 
home government officials to a forthcoming policy change would allow home-market positioning 
so that no losses are incurred by the ECB policy action. Hard evidence regarding such 
information asymmetry is essentially impossible to present. However, wide spreads on the euro 
would be consistent with market makers protecting against the adverse selection probabilities of 
quoting to an informed trader. In addition, on the day the ECB first changes interest rates, there is 
a flurry of exchange rate volatility more than an hour prior to the public revelation of the news of 
the policy action. This is consistent with leakage of the news during the meeting. We point out 
that this evidence of market anticipation of the policy change was not repeated in later meeting 
days. So if there was any significant leakage of information, it may have been associated with the 
start-up of the policy process rather than an ongoing phenomenon. However, we also show 
intradaily evidence that some FOMC meeting days also have exchange rate volatility spikes prior 
to the meeting end.  So one must be careful not to argue that the ECB is unique in these aspects.  
The evidence taken as a whole offers little, if any, support for information asymmetries created by 
leaks from ECB policy meetings.   
  We also point out that the evidence on wider spreads in the early euro period is greatly 
reduced if one calculates percentage spreads.  Since the euro would be quoted in units greater 
than 1 in the first year while the mark was quoted in units considerably below 1, it is not 
surprising that the (ask-bid) is greater for the euro than the mark.  When spreads are measured in 
percentage terms, there is a much smaller difference between spreads on the euro in 1999 and 
those on the mark.  While much was made of the supposed wider spreads associated with the euro 
  27compared to the mark, the evidence is rather weak in support of the argument that the use of the 
euro has been limited by higher transaction costs. 
  With respect to the level of the exchange rate, we suggest that the market was learning 
about the ECB ability to maintain low inflation in Europe. We model this learning using Bayesian 
estimation and calculate probabilities that reflect the market’s beliefs about the ECB’s low 
inflation commitment. The calculated probabilities indicate that it was not until the fall of 2000 
that the market assessed a greater than 50 percent probability that the inflation process changed.  
From this point on, the trend depreciation ends and further increases in the probability of the new 
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  29Table 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR THE MARK AND THE EURO
1.a.  Level of the exchange rate 
  Dollar/DM Dollar/Euro 
Mean 0.61578  1.06114 
Maximum 0.67310  1.19000 
Minimum 0.56561  0.99965 
Standard Deviation  0.02974  0.03592 
1.b.  First difference of the Log-level of the exchange rate 
  Dollar/DM Dollar/Euro 
Mean  1.762 E-07  -8.18 E-08 
Maximum 0.003223  0.00742 
Minimum -0.005350  -0.00772 
Standard Deviation  0.000198  0.00019 
1.c.  Spreads 
  Dollar/DM Dollar/Euro 
Mean 0.00025  0.00047 
Maximum 0.00225  0.00360 
Minimum 6.408  E-05  0.00001 
Standard Deviation  0.00009  0.00019 
1.d.  % Spreads 
  Dollar/DM Dollar/Euro 
Mean 0.00040  0.00045 
Maximum 0.00383  0.00304 
Minimum 0.00011  9.295  E-06 






  30Table 2 
MONTHLY AVERAGE DOLLAR/EURO SPREAD IN 1999 
 Month  Spread 
  January 1999  0.000548174 
  February 1999  0.000497459 
  March 1999  0.000517254 
  April 1999  0.000503020 
  May 1999  0.000493815 
  June 1999  0.000474562 
  July 1999  0.000464078 
  August 1999  0.000472378 
  September 1999  0.000463324 
  October 1999  0.000444362 
  November 1999  0.000461528 















  31Table 3 
PROBABILITY THAT THE INFLATION PROCESS 
HAS SWITCHED 
These probabilities where calculated assuming that the final probability of the old 
process   and the final probability of the new process  , 0.01 ot P = , 0.99 nt P =  
0.00334483 0.0016666 on and δδ ==  
  Month  n P  
  January 99  1.78 E-05 
  February 99  2.73 E-05 
  March 99  4.33 E-05 
  April 99  6.88 E-05 
  May 99  0.00011 
  June 99  0.00024 
  July 99  0.00047 
  August 99  0.00094 
  September 99  0.00203 
  October 99  0.00399 
  November 99  0.00858 
  December 99  0.01715 
  January 00  0.02729 
  February 00  0.05360 
  March 00  0.08382 
  April 00  0.09225 
  May 00  0.17992 
  June 00  0.32139 
  July 00  0.23910 
  August 00  0.38911 
  September 00  0.55699 
  October 00  0.45969 
  November 00  0.62678 
  December 00  0.73409 
  January 01  0.85629 
  February 01  0.90258 
  March 01  0.76842 
  April 01  0.79401 
  May 01  0.73254 
  June 01  0.51021 
  July 01  0.69208 
  August 01  0.77856 
  September 01  0.87405 
  October 01  0.92077 
  November 01  0.94789 
  December 01  0.96606 
  January 02  0.98309 
  February 02  0.98581 
  March 02  0.99337 
  April 02  0.96561 
  May 02  0.95518 
  June 02  0.97871 
  32Table 4 
THE EFFECT OF INFLATION LEARNING ON THE EXCHANGE RATE 
() $/ Pr Pr * Log E ob ob Dummy ε αβ δ ∆= + ∆ + ∆  
Variable Coefficient  Std.  Error  t-Statistic  Prob. 
α   -0.004912 0.004549  -1.079897  0.2868 
Prob ∆   -0.094514 0.093149  -1.014661  0.3165 
Pr * ob Dummy ∆   0.238641 0.112266  2.125677  0.0399 
R-squared  0.130633     Mean dependent var  -0.004130
Adjusted R-squared  0.086050     S.D. dependent var  0.029439
S.E. of regression  0.028144     Akaike info criterion  -4.234228
Sum squared resid  0.030891     Schwarz criterion  -4.110109
Log likelihood  91.91878     F-statistic  2.930108
Durbin-Watson stat  1.680125     Prob(F-statistic)  0.065232
 
 
Autocorrelation  Partial Correlation    AC    PAC  Q-Stat   Prob 
      . |*.     |        . |*.     |  1 0.094 0.094 0.3977  0.528
      . | .     |        . | .     |  2 0.050 0.041 0.5125  0.774
      .*| .     |        .*| .     |  3 -0.069 -0.078 0.7381  0.864
      **| .     |        **| .     |  4 -0.253 -0.246 3.8482  0.427
      . | .     |        . | .     |  5 -0.040 0.009 3.9279  0.560
      .*| .     |        .*| .     |  6 -0.091 -0.070 4.3499  0.629
      . |*.     |        . |*.     |  7 0.148 0.142 5.5028  0.599
      . |*.     |        . |*.     |  8 0.144 0.074 6.6358  0.576
      . | .     |        . | .     |  9 0.060 0.016 6.8401  0.654
      . |*.     |        . | .     |  10 0.073 0.034 7.1520  0.711
      . | .     |        . |*.     |  11 0.053 0.128 7.3207  0.773
      .*| .     |        . | .     |  12 -0.064 -0.037 7.5722  0.818
      **| .     |        **| .     |  13 -0.214 -0.193 10.491  0.653
      . |*.     |        . |**     |  14 0.140 0.234 11.779  0.624
      .*| .     |        .*| .     |  15 -0.063 -0.078 12.051  0.675
      . |*.     |        . |*.     |  16 0.140 0.105 13.445  0.640
      . |*.     |        . | .     |  17 0.120 0.032 14.511  0.631
      . | .     |        . | .     |  18 -0.012 -0.006 14.522  0.694
      . | .     |        .*| .     |  19 0.006 -0.079 14.525  0.752
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Figure 1




















































































































































































 Figure 2:  Exchange Rate Volatility on Days of ECB, Federal Reserve, and Bundesbank 
Policy Actions 
 
The figures plot exchange rate volatility as measured by the square of the change in the log of the dollar/euro 
exchange rate sampled at 1-minute intervals (multiplied by 10,000,000).  Figures are shown for days when 
target interest rates were changed for 3 groups: a) ECB meeting days in 1999 and the dollar/euro exchange rate; 
b) Bundesbank meeting days in 1994 and the dollar/mark exchange rate; and c) FOMC meeting days in 1999 
and the dollar/euro exchange rate.    Vertical lines in each figure indicate the time of day when the Bloomberg 
news service reported the change in interest rates resulting from the meeting. 
 









































































































































































b) FOMC Meeting Days 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































  34Figure 3
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